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Abstract: 
The interrelationship between financial constraints and firm activity is a hotly debated 
issue. The way firms cope with financial constraints is fundamental to the analysis of 
monetary transmission, of financial stability and of growth and development. The CBI 
Industrial Trends Survey contains detailed information on the financial constraints faced 
by a large sample of UK manufacturers. This paper uses the quarterly CBI Industrial 
Trends Survey firm level data between January 1989 and October 1999. The cleaned 
sample contains 49,244 quarterly observations on 5,196 firms. As more than 63% of the 
observations refer to firms with less than 200 employees, the data set is especially well 
suited for comparing large and small companies. The data set is presented and a new 
method of checking the informational content of the data is developed. Whereas the 
relationship between investment activity and financial constraints is theoretically am-
bivalent due to simultaneity, the link between financial constraints on the one hand and 
the prevalence and duration of capacity gaps on the other should be unambiguously 
positive. Looking at the relationship between both types of constraints, two important 
results emerge. First, there is shown to be informational content in the survey data on 
financial constraints. Specifically, financially constrained firms take longer to close 
capacity gaps. This indicates that financial constraints do indeed play a part in the in-
vestment process. Second, small firms close their capacity gaps faster than large firms 
do, but financial constraints seem to be of higher relevance to their adjustment dynam-
ics.  
Keywords:   Financial  constraints,  investment, capacity adjustment, small 
firm finance, duration analysis. 
JEL-Classification:  D21, D92, C33, C41 
Non Technical Summary 
Recent research has shown that the causes and effects of financial constraints for firms 
in the private sector is of key importance for a variety of policy issues relevant to central 
banks. First, the quantitative and qualitative features of monetary transmission depend 
on whether or not a credit channel exists. Second, the real consequences of shocks to the 
financial system are conditioned by the way in which firms cope with their financial 
constraints. Due to credit chains between firms, financial constraints also may form part 
of a propagation mechanism creating systemic risk. Third, financial constraints might be 
especially relevant for future oriented activities that are difficult to collateralise but 
quite important for economic growth, such as research and development, or the intro-
duction of innovative products and processes. 
Survey data have a decisive advantage over other micro data sources: firm managers 
can be directly asked for the relevant constraints to their activities. Unlike balance sheet 
information, these data are available in a timely manner. Potentially this makes them a 
valuable tool in policy analysis. When detecting financial constraints, no questionable a 
priori grouping is necessary, and there is no need to rely on ambiguous cash flow sensi-
tivities. However, it is necessary to make sure that their statements are compatible with 
how economists use the concept of financial constraints. Patterns of answers need to 
correspond to what theoretically might be expected in a financially constricted envi-
ronment.  
We are able to explore the data base for the CBI Industrial Trends Survey (ITS), which 
is an important survey for business cycle analysis in the United Kingdom. For the 11 
years between January 1989 and October 1999, the cleaned, unbalanced panel contains 
49,244 quarterly observations on 5,196 firms. According to the CBI, the ITS represents 
around 33% of the total current employment within UK manufacturing. The data set 
covers all size ranges but specifically small firms are represented well, on which very 
little information is available from micro data sets based on quoted companies. More 
than 63% of the ITS observations refer to firms with less than 200 employees. On aver-
age, around 20.8% of respondents state that they are constrained by the lack of either  
internal or external financial resources, and that these constraints have an influence on 
their investment behaviour.  
After describing the financing environment for small firms in the UK during the nine-
ties, we present the data set by means of descriptive statistics. At this level of analysis, 
the differences between large and small firms appear modest. We proceed to examine 
the informational content of our data on financial constraints. Our focus is on capacity 
adjustment, as the ITS data on capacity gaps, planned expansion and rates of capacity 
utilisation are especially rich. Firms report whether their capacity is insufficient with 
respect to demand. Those firms which indicate financial constraints should be capacity 
constrained more often and take longer to close a capacity gap – either because they are 
less able to finance their investments or else because they have bigger gaps to fill.  
First, we look at the statistical association between two types of constraints: capacity 
restrictions and financial constraints. We test whether those two types of constraints 
tend to occur jointly. Then we look at the time dimension, undertaking a duration analy-
sis with respect to spells of capacity restrictions. To the best of our knowledge, the du-
ration of capacity constraints has never been investigated before on a micro-economet-
ric level.  
For both size classes, we find a clear contemporaneous association between the two 
types of constraints. This association stays intact when we condition on whether capac-
ity constraints were present in the previous period. With respect to duration, financially 
constrained firms do take longer to end a period of insufficient capacity. The measured 
difference in duration is clear, but not spectacular. In any given moment of time, a firm 
will leave the state of capacity restrictions with a rate that is about 20% lower if it is 
financially constrained, compared to a firm that does not report financial constraints. 
This is entirely consistent with results we obtain from association analysis if we restrict 
our attention to capacity restricted firms: a firm will leave this state with a probability of 
about 50% if it is not financially constrained, but with a probability of only about 40% 
if it reports shortages of internal finance or the inability to raise external finance. 
This leads us to conclude that there is informational content in our survey data on finan-
cial constraints – a necessary condition for using them in regular policy analysis is ful-
filled.  
Splitting the sample shows that the relationship between financial constraints and the 
duration of capacity restrictions is weaker for larger firms, indicating that financial con-
straints might be of less relevance to their activity. On the other hand, it is quite inter-
esting to see that small firms appear to be able to overcome their capacity shortfalls 
faster than larger firms - both in general and conditional on their financial status. This 
might indicate that small firms, due to flat hierarchies and low co-ordination costs, are 
more flexible in coping with the demand shocks typical for their size.  
Nicht technische Zusammenfassung 
Neuere Untersuchungen haben gezeigt, dass die Ursachen und Wirkungen von Fi-
nanzierungsbeschränkungen bei Unternehmen des privaten Sektors bei einer Vielzahl 
von zentralbankrelevanten Problemen von großer Bedeutung sind. Erstens hängen die 
quantitativen und qualitativen Merkmale der monetären Transmission davon ab, ob ein 
Kreditkanal aktiv ist oder nicht. Zweitens werden die realwirtschaftlichen Folgen von 
Schocks auf das Finanzsystem von der Art und Weise bestimmt, wie Unternehmen ihre 
Finanzierungsbeschränkungen bewältigen. Weil Unternehmen durch Kreditketten ver-
bunden sind, können finanzielle Beschränkungen Teil eines Ausbreitungsmechanismus 
werden, der letztlich zu systemische Risiken führt. Drittens könnten Finanzierungsbe-
schränkungen vor allem solche zukunftsorientierte Aktivitäten treffen, die schwer zu 
besichern, aber ausgesprochen wichtig für das Wirtschaftswachstum sind, wie bei-
spielsweise Forschung und Entwicklung oder die Einführung innovativer Produkte und 
Verfahren. 
Surveydaten haben gegenüber anderen Mikrodatenquellen einen entscheidenden 
Vorteil: Die Führungskräfte der Unternehmen können unmittelbar nach den Beschrän-
kungen für ihre Aktivitäten befragt werden. Anders als Bilanzdaten liegen diese Anga-
ben zeitnah vor, was sie potenziell zu einem wertvollen Instrument im Rahmen der Po-
litikberatung macht. Bei der Diagnose finanzieller Beschränkungen ist weder eine frag-
würdige a priori Einstufung nötig, noch ist man gezwungen, sich auf wenig aussage-
kräftige Cashflow-Sensitivitäten zu verlassen. Allerdings muss sichergestellt werden, 
dass die Angaben mit dem ökonomischen Konzept finanzieller Beschränkungen verein-
bar sind. Die Antwortmuster sollen dem entsprechen, was angesichts finanzieller Be-
schränkungen theoretisch zu erwarten wäre.  
Wir können auf die Datenbank des Industrial Trends Survey (ITS) der Confedera-
tion of British Industry (CBI) zurückgreifen, einer der wichtigen Surveys für die Ana-
lyse der konjunkturellen Entwicklung im Vereinigten Königreich. Für die elf Jahre von 
Januar 1989 bis Oktober 1999 enthält das bereinigte, ungleichgewichtige Panel 49 244 
Quartalsangaben zu 5196 Unternehmen. Laut CBI repräsentieren die im ITS befragten 
Unternehmen rund 33 % der Gesamtbeschäftigung im verarbeitenden Gewerbe des Ver- 
einigten Königreichs. Die Daten decken alle Unternehmensgrößen ab, vor allem aber 
sind kleine Firmen gut vertreten, zu denen nur sehr wenige Mikrodatensätze auf Basis 
börsennotierter Unternehmen zur Verfügung stehen. Über 63 % der ITS-Umfragedaten 
beziehen sich auf Unternehmen mit weniger als 200 Mitarbeitern. Durchschnittlich ge-
ben rund 20,8 % der Befragten an, dass sie durch das Fehlen interner oder externer Fi-
nanzierungsmittel beschränkt sind und dass diese Beschränkungen ihr Investitionsver-
halten beeinflussen.  
Nach einer Beschreibung des finanziellen Umfelds für kleine, im Vereinigten Kö-
nigreich ansässige Unternehmen während der Neunzigerjahre nehmen wir zunächst eine 
deskriptive Analyse der Datenbasis vor. Auf dieser Stufe erscheinen die Unterschiede 
zwischen großen und kleinen Unternehmen gering. Im Weiteren untersuchen wir den 
Informationsgehalt der uns vorliegenden Daten zu Finanzierungsbeschränkungen. Unser 
Augenmerk liegt auf der Kapazitätsanpassung, da die ITS-Angaben zu Ka-
pazitätslücken, geplanter Ausweitung und zur Kapazitätsauslastung besonders ergiebig 
sind. Die Unternehmen geben an, ob ihre Kapazität gemessen an der Nachfrage zu ge-
ring ist. Unternehmen, die finanzielle Engpässe anzeigen, sollten häufiger Kapazitäts-
engpässe aufweisen und mehr Zeit benötigen, um eine Kapazitätslücke zu schließen – 
entweder weil sie größere Probleme bei der Finanzierung ihrer Investitionen haben oder 
weil sie größere Lücken schließen müssen.  
Wir betrachten zunächst die statistische Assoziation zwischen zwei Arten von Be-
schränkungen: den Kapazitätsrestriktionen und Finanzierungsbeschränkungen. Wir un-
tersuchen, ob diese Arten von Beschränkungen tendenziell im Verbund auftreten. Im 
Anschluss betrachten wir die zeitliche Dimension, wobei wir eine Verweildaueranalyse 
mit Blick auf die Zeitdauer von Kapazitätsbeschränkungen durchführen. Unseres Wis-
sens ist die Verweildauer von Kapazitätsengpässen noch nie zuvor mikroökonometrisch 
untersucht worden.  
Für beide Größenklassen lässt sich ein klarer zeitlicher Gleichlauf der beiden Ein-
schränkungsarten aufzeigen. Dieser bleibt auch dann bestehen, wenn wir uns auf die 
Betrachtung derjenigen Fälle beschränken, bei denen bereits in der vorgegangenen Peri-
ode Kapazitätsengpässe verzeichnet wurden. Was die Dauer betrifft, so benötigen finan-
ziell beschränkte Unternehmen mehr Zeit, um eine Phase unzureichender Kapazität zu  
überwinden. Der Unterschied ist deutlich, aber nicht spektakulär. Die Rate, mit der Un-
ternehmen sich von Kapazitätsengpässen befreien, ist bei finanziell beschränkten Unter-
nehmen rund 20 % niedriger als bei solchen Unternehmen, die keine Finanzierungseng-
pässe zu verzeichnen hatten. Dies passt sehr gut zu den Ergebnissen der Assoziations-
analyse, wenn wir die Betrachtung auf die Unternehmen mit Kapazitätsengpässen be-
schränken: Ein Unternehmen, das finanziell nicht beschränkt ist, wird in einem gegebe-
nen Quartal einen solchen Engpass mit einer etwa 50 %-igen Wahrscheinlichkeit über-
winden, während die entsprechende Wahrscheinlichkeit bei einem Unternehmen mit 
unzureichender Innenfinanzierung oder fehlender Möglichkeit zur Außenfinanzierung 
sich auf nur etwa 40 % beläuft. 
Daraus können wir schließen, dass unsere Umfragedaten zu Finanzierungsengpäs-
sen einen Informationsgehalt haben – womit eine Grundvoraussetzung für ihre Nutzung 
im Rahmen der regelmäßigen Politikberatung gegeben ist. 
Eine Zerlegung der Stichproben zeigt, dass der Zusammenhang zwischen Finan-
zierungsengpässen und der Dauer der Kapazitätsbeschränkungen bei größeren Unter-
nehmen schwächer ist, was nahe legt, dass finanzielle Beschränkungen möglicherweise 
für die Aktivitäten großer Unternehmen von geringerer Bedeutung sind. Auf der ande-
ren Seite ist es bemerkenswert, dass kleine Unternehmen ihre Kapazitätsengpässe of-
fenbar schneller in den Griff bekommen können als größere Firmen – sowohl im All-
gemeinen als auch unter Berücksichtigung ihres finanziellen Status. Dies könnte darauf 
hindeuten, dass kleine Unternehmen aufgrund flacher Hierarchien und niedriger Koor-
dinationskosten in der Auseinandersetzung mit den für ihre Größenordnung typischen 
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   1
Financial Constraints and Capacity Adjustment in  
the United Kingdom. 
Evidence from a Large Panel of Survey Data
∗) 
1 Introduction 
Firms’ activities are financially constrained if internal finance is insufficient and 
external finance is either relatively costly, carrying an external finance premium, or 
rationed. Understanding the causes and effects of financial constraints is of key impor-
tance for a variety of policy issues. In monetary transmission theory, the credit channel 
is supposed to condition and amplify the ‘neo-classical’ relative price effects of interest 
rate changes on firm activity. Monetary policy may affect the ability of banks to finance 
firms (bank lending channel), or else influence firms’ ability to attract external finance 
by affecting the value of their equity (balance sheet channel).
1 Second, financial con-
straints on real activities form one crucial link that determines the real consequences of 
financial imbalances of various types, like banking crises or asset price bubbles. Under 
financial constraints, the net value of firms becomes an important determinant of their 
growth prospects. If firms form credit chains, their financial constraints become also 
important for the propagation of financial shocks, potentially creating systemic risk.
2 
Ultimately, financial constraints due to asymmetric information are especially important 
for those future oriented activities that deal with generating new knowledge: research, 
                                                 
∗)  Correspondence: Ulf von Kalckreuth, Deutsche Bundesbank, Economics Dept., Wilhelm Epstein-Str. 
14, D-60431 Frankfurt, Germany; e-mail:   ulf.von-kalckreuth@bundesbank.de. The views expressed 
in this paper are those of the authors, and not necessarily those of the Bank of England or the Deutsche 
Bundesbank. This paper was written while Ulf von Kalckreuth was on secondment at the Bank of 
England. It is also published in the Bank of England Working Paper Series. Encouragement and sup-
port by Charles Bean, Peter Brierley, Heinz Herrmann, and Garry Young were pivotal in making the 
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1   Chirinko and von Kalckreuth (2003a) compare the interest rate channel and the balance sheet channel 
for German firms. 
2   See Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), or Stiglitz and Greenwald (2003), Chapter 7.   2 
development, and the introduction of innovative products and processes.
3 These activi-
ties are fundamental to the long-run performance of any economic system. 
For all these reasons, the study of firm financial constraints on a micro level is a 
major topic on the research agenda. A recent co-ordinated research effort by the Euro-
pean System of Central Banks (ESCB) utilised large national balance sheet databases to 
show that financial constraints do seem to matter for firm investment and the monetary 
transmission process (see Chatelain, Generale, Hernando, von Kalckreuth and Ver-
meulen (2003a) for an overview). However, unlike much of the literature on US firms, 
size does not seem to be a good indicator of informational asymmetries and the assorted 
financial constraints in European countries. Among some of the larger euro area coun-
tries – France, Germany, Italy and Spain – only Italian small firms show an excess sen-
sitivity of investment with respect to cash flow.
4 
It is conceivable that the importance of financial constraints for the real activity of 
firms also depends on the financial system. Allen and Gale (2001) argue that intermedi-
aries and markets may have different comparative advantages. A market-based system 
deals better with situations where innovations occur and where there is a fundamental 
diversity of opinion, whereas intermediaries are able to save transaction costs when a 
large amount of experience has been gained and things are no longer changing. The 
empirical patterns of financial constraints and their importance for monetary policy, 
financial stability and innovation and growth may therefore depend on economic insti-
tutions.  
This paper is part of a larger research effort based on large panels of survey data, 
which aims to compare the significance of financial constraints for firm behaviour in 
bank-based Germany and the capital market based UK, see von Kalckreuth (2004) for 
first results on Germany. With respect to the UK, we are able to explore the data base 
for the CBI Industrial Trends Survey (ITS), which is an important survey for business 
cycle analysis in the United Kingdom. For the 11 years between January 1989 and Oc-
                                                 
3   See, for example, Hall (2002). The point was made as early as 1962 by Kenneth J. Arrow, already 
using explicitly a moral hazard argument. Demsetz’ (1969) critique makes plain that informational in-
efficiencies by themselves do not create a case for government intervention – the market fails with re-
spect to a nirvana situation of perfect informational symmetry. See also Stigler (1967). 
4   The key results have been collected in Angeloni, Kasyhap and Mojon (eds., 2003): see Chatelain, 
Generale, Hernando, von Kalckreuth and Vermeulen (2003b) for a detailed comparative study.   3
tober 1999, our cleaned unbalanced panel contains 49,244 quarterly observations on 
5,196 firms. According to the CBI, the ITS represents around 33% of the total current 
employment within UK manufacturing.  
Apart from its size and coverage, the data-set has two important characteristics. 
First, it contains many small firms, on which very little information is available from 
micro data-sets based on quoted companies. More than 63% of the ITS observations 
refer to firms with less than 200 employees. Second, the data-set contains detailed in-
formation on the financial constraints that firms face in their investment decisions. No-
tably, a number of firms explicitly state two things: that they are constrained by the lack 
of either internal or external financial resources, and that these constraints have an in-
fluence on their investment behaviour.  
This is exactly what the bulk of the empirical literature on financial constraints, 
following the seminal article by Fazzari, Hubbard and Peterson (1988), tries to prove. 
The standard procedure in this literature is to split the sample by some criterion that a 
priori identifies firms as being financially constrained or unconstrained, such as size, 
dividend behaviour or the risk of default, and then to test whether the observed differ-
ences in investment behaviour between the two types of firm are consistent with what is 
to be expected by a better or worse financial standing in a situation of asymmetric in-
formation.
5 Armed with the CBI data, this complicated and very indirect procedure, 
heavily criticised on theoretical grounds by Kaplan and Zingales (1997, 2000), seems to 
be unnecessary: a subset of respondents explicitly claim to be constrained. However, it 
needs to be examined whether they have told the truth, i.e. whether or not there is in-
formational content in their assertions. If this is the case, we have the chance to take a 
closer look at the interrelationship between financial constraints and investment de-
mand.  
We start out by describing the financing environment for small firms in the UK (Section 
2). Small firms are deemed to be especially vulnerable to financing constraints. During 
the 1980s and early 1990s, the availability of credit for small firms in the UK was gen-
erally regarded as unsatisfactory. Since then, with the upturn in the 1990s, the situation 
appears to have eased.  
                                                 
5   See, for example, Chirinko and von Kalckreuth (2002).   4 
The next part, Section 3, is dedicated to the presentation of our data-set. Harness-
ing the panel variation in the micro database of a time-tested survey offers the chance to 
improve our understanding of funding constraints considerably. The raw percentages do 
not show small firms as being particularly strongly affected by financial constraints. Al-
though the severest form of financial constraints – inability to raise external finance – is 
more prevalent among small firms (5.1% compared with 3.0% for the other size 
groups), the share of small firms reporting inadequate internal finance is actually 
slightly smaller (18.2% as against 20.4% for all other size groups). 
Section 4 of our paper examines the informational content of our data on financial 
constraints. Our focus is on capacity adjustment, as the ITS data on capacity gaps, 
planned expansion and rates of capacity utilisation are especially rich. First, we look at 
the  association between two types of constraints: capacity restrictions and financial 
constraints, and then we undertake a duration analysis with respect to spells of capacity 
restrictions. Firms report whether their capacity is insufficient with respect to demand. 
Those firms which indicate financial constraints should take longer to close a capacity 
gap if there is informational content in their answers – either because they are less able 
to finance their investments or else because they have bigger gaps to fill. To the best of 
our knowledge, the duration of capacity constraints has never been investigated before 
on a micro-econometric level. 
For both size classes, we find a clear contemporaneous association between the 
two types of constraints. With respect to duration, financially constrained firms do take 
longer to end a period of insufficient capacity. However, splitting the sample shows that 
the latter relationship is statistically significant only for small firms. For larger firms, 
the measured difference in duration is less marked and not significant at conventional 
levels. It is quite interesting to see that small firms appear to be able to overcome their 
capacity shortfalls faster than larger firms - both in general and conditional on their fi-
nancial status. The paper ends with a conclusion in Section 5.   5
2  The financing environment for small firms in the UK 
Small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) form an important part of the British 
economy. They account for almost 54% of gross value added in the economy, excluding 
the public sector, and almost 40% of net capital expenditure.
6 In some sectors, the 
productivity of SMEs exceeds that of larger firms.
7 SMEs also account for 56% of em-
ployment and 52% of turnover.
8 Historically, however, they have faced particular prob-
lems in accessing finance. Every UK government in recent times has laid special em-
phasis on developing the SME sector as an engine of both growth and productivity. De-
spite the rapid growth of the British SME sector since the 1970s, rates of entrepreneurial 
activity remain only moderate in international terms. In particular, the UK appears to 
lag behind the US in terms of high growth start-ups. Access to finance, especially risk 
capital, is felt to be one of the key barriers and it is deemed important to ensure that 
there is an effective supply of finance for this sector.
9 
The political interest in the topic has spawned academic research. Hughes 
(1994)
10 considers the comparative financial structures and profitability of large and 
small companies between 1987 and 1989. He recognises a number of important differ-
ences in the financial structure between larger and smaller firms in the UK during this 
time. Small companies were more highly geared, more reliant on short-term bank debt 
and less profitable than larger firms. Traditionally, economists have argued that such 
financial structures are due to market imperfections which arise mainly as a result of 
information asymmetries.
11 The owner of a small business generally has much better 
information than the bank on his firm’s performance, and has more control of the out-
come. These asymmetries may lead to: (i) adverse selection where banks find it difficult 
to use the price mechanism to distinguish between firms; and (ii) moral hazard where, in 
the absence of collateral, use of higher interest rates by banks to offset risk would give 
firms an incentive to alter their behaviour to adopt more risky projects. In the light of 
                                                 
6   See Bank of England (2003).  
7   See Bank of England (2003). 
8   See Small Business Service (2003), www.sbs.gov.uk/statistics SME statistics for the UK (2002), Table 
3, All industries. 
9   See HM Treasury/Small Business Service (2003). 
10  See also Cosh and Hughes (1994) for further details. 
11  Imperfections are also said to arise from agency costs, bankruptcy costs, appraisal and monitoring 
problems and an illiquid equity market.   6 
the model set up by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), it has been argued that such problems 
lead to credit rationing for small firms – that is, finance is not made available to all 
firms with viable projects whose net present value is positive. Owing to the asymmetry 
of information between banks and small firms, markets are not cleared through the price 
mechanism, and banks have an incentive to respond to an increased demand in loans by 
rationing credit rather than by raising interest rates. 
Empirical evidence of such failures remains mixed. A report by ACOST
12 in 1990 
asserts that qualitative evidence supports the view that the observed capital structure of 
some small firms was due to failures relating to the supply of finance. However, most 
other evidence provides little conclusive support of such market imperfections in the 
financing of small firms in the United Kingdom in general.
13 The financial structure of 
small firms is seen by many as due predominantly to the optimal choice of 
owner/managers. Norton (1990) believes that managerial beliefs and desires play a key 
role in determining a small firm’s capital structure and that management perception of a 
target debt ratio and of the trade-offs involved in external financing will determine the 
actual mix of debt and equity used. Smaller companies have lower fixed investment and 
avoid external finance owing to differences in growth strategies and so, in effect, stay 
small by choice. This is confirmed by anecdotal evidence of debt aversion among small 
firms, especially following the recession in the early 1990s.
14 Mason and Harrison 
(2001) recently investigated the investment readiness of small firms and their results 
show an aversion to ceding control via the dilution of equity. Hay and Morris (1984) 
maintain that the lower fixed asset proportion reflects a choice of flexible production 
methods whilst the structure of long and short-term liabilities may reflect a desire to 
maintain maximum freedom from external interference. Aghion and Bolton (1992) ar-
gue that the wealth-constrained owners place an intrinsic value on ownership, so stan-
dard debt financing may therefore be the best way to implement control arrangements.  
Throughout the 1990s, trends in small firms financing suggest that there was a 
steady improvement in how finance providers service the market and there were fairly 
major changes in small firms financing patterns. One change has been that small firms 
                                                 
12  See Advisory Council on Science and Technology (1990). 
13 However, supply side problems are seen as more relevant to particular types of SME such as innova-
tive, technology based firms or those with a substantial product development timescale.   7
have, in the aggregate, become markedly less dependent on external finance, although 
to what extent this due to changes in demand or constraints on supply is unclear. Re-
cently published research
15 shows that only 39% of small firms sought external finance 
of any kind between 2000 and 2002, compared with 65% between 1987 and 1990 and 
that access to finance is rarely mentioned by small firms as a major barrier to growth. 
For those small firms that do access external finance, the proportion accounted for by 
bank finance has declined. This partly reflects a shift towards factoring and asset-based 
finance. However, it also reflects an absolute decline in the net indebtedness of the sec-
tor. Furthermore, total small business deposits at banks have been greater than total 
lending to the sector since 1997. These findings have been corroborated by work from 
the Manchester Business School
16 showing that the average gearing levels of small, pri-
vately held firms fell between 1992 and 1996. This development may well represent a 
return to normality. 
In our work, we want to focus on an aspect of the problem that has been neglected 
hitherto. It may well be that the financial structures of small and large firms differ con-
siderably, but do these differences really reflect binding constraints? Do financial con-
straints matter for firm behaviour? Our database contains self-assessments on the finan-
cial limits to investment, and we can combine this information with rich data on the 
firms’ real activity. 
3 The  data-set 
3.1  The CBI Industrial Trends Survey 
The CBI Industrial Trends Survey (ITS) is a qualitative survey that looks at short 
and medium-term trends in the UK manufacturing and processing industries. By ex-
cluding all seasonal variations, its questions focus on recent and imminent trends in 
order to allow for direct measures of business perceptions and expectations. The survey 
is a postal questionnaire aimed at a senior level within firms. The CBI produces both a 
monthly and quarterly survey, the latter providing more in-depth analysis. It covers a 
wide range of subject areas including optimism regarding the general and export busi-
                                                                                                                                               
14  See Bank of England (1998). 
15  See Cosh and Hughes (2003). 
16  See Chittenden, Michaelas and Poutziouris (1999).   8 
ness situation, investment, capacity, order books, numbers employed, output, deliveries, 
stocks, prices, constraints to output, export orders and on investment, competitiveness 
regarding domestic, EU and non-EU market, innovation and training. The quarterly 
survey is the empirical basis for our analysis. Mitchell, Smith and Weale (2002a and b) 
have used the ITS micro data to show that disaggregate survey based indicators they 
developed can outperform traditional aggregate indicators. The full text of the question-
naire can be found in Wood (2001).  
Table 1: Breakdown of data-set by employment size 
 
Source: CBI Industrial Trends Survey 
According to the CBI, the ITS represents around 33% of the total current em-
ployment within UK manufacturing. The survey has an average response rate of 1000, 
around 50% of the total number of firms that are on the survey panel. The survey has a 
core of around 800 companies, the rest being floating participants. The survey sample is 
constructed from a broad mix of CBI membership, trade association member companies 
and others, with the aim of ensuring both sector and regional representation.
17 Our 
investigation focuses on 11 years of data between January 1989 and October 1999. The 
cleaned, unbalanced panel contains 49,244 quarterly observations on 5,169 firms. We 
exclude any divisions of a company, as their information might not be truly relevant to 
questions relating to size or financial constraints. Furthermore, we exclude all anony-
mous responses because these companies cannot be tracked over time. For these rea-
sons, our descriptive statistics are not identical to the results published by the CBI. 
Apart from its size and coverage, the data-set has a number of important charac-
teristics. First, the survey consists of four employment size groups, the largest of which 
looks at small firms with less than 199 employees. As can be seen in Table 1, 63% of 
the ITS observations refer to these small firms. This is extremely valuable, as very little 
                                                 
17 See Wood (2001), describing the current state of affairs. During our sample period the response rate 
was slightly higher. Our raw data include 51,381 observations from 44 quarters, ie 11,68 observations 
on average.  
 Employment  Size 
   1-199  200-499 500 - 4.999 5.000 and over  Total
No. of firms  3,394  1,060 647 68  5,169
No. of obs.  31,089  10,222 6,994 939  49,244  9
information is available from other micro data-sets, which are generally based on larger, 
quoted companies. The CBI uses these data to produce a report entitled the Quarterly 
SME Trends Survey, one of the most comprehensive specialist surveys in the SME field. 
Second, the ITS has a wide-ranging base of firms from the UK manufacturing and proc-
essing industries and Table 2 shows the breakdown of two-digit SIC codes by obser-
vation. 
Table 2: Number of observations split by employment size and 2 digit SIC code 
 
2 Digit SIC code           Employment Size 
               1-199 200-499 500-4999
5000  
and over  Total
Coke ovens       17 6 17 0  40
Mineral oil  processing      73 35 38 11  157
Nuclear fuel production     0002   2
Extraction & preparation of metalliferous ores   35 0 0 0  35
Metal manufacturing      1,429 460 292 62  2,243
Extraction of minerals not elsewhere specified  493 60 103 9 665
Manufacturing of non-metallic mineral products   1,286 436 443 85 2,250
Chemical industries      1,191 722 641 79  2,633
Production of man-made fibres     142 8 32 1  183
Manufacturing of metal goods not elsewhere specified  3,048 651 308 6 4,013
Mechanical engineering     7,116 1,718 1,028 23  9,885
Manufacturing of office machinery & data processing  103 26 90 7 226
Electrical & electronic engineering     2,991 1,420 808 54  5,273
Manufacturing of motor vehicles & parts thereof  691 409 409 187 1,696
Manufacturing of other transport equipment   315 132 136 111  694
Instrument engineering     838 230 69 0  1,137
Food, drink & tobacco manufacturing industries part 1  473 250 420 43 1,186
Food, drink & tobacco manufacturing industries part 2  689 399 454 151 1,693
Textile industries      2,427 1,098 594 7  4,126
Manufacturing of leather & leather goods   295 63 2 0  360
Footwear & clothing industries     1,439 478 262 39  2,218
Timber & wooden furniture industries    1,258 313 154 1  1,726
Manufacturing of paper & paper products   2,854 668 489 38  4,049
Processing of rubber & plastics     1,698 563 169 22  2,452
Other manufacturing industries     188 77 36 1  302
Total       31,089 10,222 6,994 939  49,244
Source: CBI Industrial Trends Survey 
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3.2  Summary descriptive statistics 
In order to compare the experience and constraints of small and larger firms, we 
simplify the size categories further, classifying as ‘small’ those firms with fewer than 
199 employees and as ‘large’ all those with 200 employees and more. This has the ef-
fect of smoothing some of the larger firms’ experiences. This is particularly true of the 
data from those firms with 5,000 and more employees. However, although the data from 
this size category is the most volatile, it is also based on the fewest observations. All 
figures within the respective size categories are simple, unweighted averages. On the 
whole, the differences in the experiences of large and small firms are surprisingly small. 
•  Optimism  
One of the most widely reported questions in the ITS looks at the optimism 
firms feel about the general business situation in their respective industry: “Are you 
more, or less, optimistic than you were four months ago about the general business 
situation in your industry?” The results are shown in Chart 1. In addition to the differ-
ence between the share of firms with a positive and a negative outlook, the graph shows 
the percentage change in the manufacturing production index, at constant 2000 prices. It 
can be seen that the optimism data reflect the general business cycle for the manufac-
turing sector fairly well. Eyeballing suggests that manufacturing output and optimism 
are roughly coincident. It is perhaps surprising that the data from the business optimism 
question of the survey show so few differences between small and large firms. Essen-
tially, the two time series seem to measure the same process. Since January 1995 the 
data have diverged to a marginally greater extent, with small firms entering the last 
business cycle downturn slightly earlier than large firms and exiting it slightly later. 
With a mean optimism rating of –0.075 for small firms compared with –0.085 for larger 
firms, the overall levels are almost identical (see Table 3).    11
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Source: CBI Industrial Trends Survey  
1 = more optimistic, 0 = same and -1 = less optimistic 
 
Table 3: Business optimism statistics 
   Mean  Std. Dev. Freq.
Small Firms  -0.075  0.703 31,089
Large 
Firms -0.085  0.679 18,155
Total -0.079  0.694 49,244
Source: CBI Industrial Trends Survey 
1 = more optimistic, 0 = same and -1 = less optimistic 
•  Output 
Question 4 of the survey reads: “Is your present level of output below capacity 
(ie are you working below a satisfactory full rate of operation)?” Small firms in the sur-
vey were more likely to state that their present level of output was currently below ca-
pacity than were large firms. Over the entire data-set, 59% of small firms believed their 
output was currently below full capacity, compared with 56% of large firms. As can be 
seen in Chart 2, small firms’ trend over time was consistently lower than that of large 
firms and has remained largely negative.   12 
Of the factors named by firms as likely to limit their output over the next four months 
(Survey Question 14), by far the most important was orders or sales, with over 80% of 
both small and large firms citing this particular factor (Chart 3). Lack of skilled labour 
was a slightly more significant factor for small firms than for large firms, whilst plant 
capacity was marginally more important to large firms. Credit and finance was men-
tioned rarely by both sets of firms, although small firms did show a higher propensity to 
cite this factor with a figure of 6% of small firms compared with 3% of large firms. 
 
















































































Large Firms Small Firms
skilled labour orders or sales
other labour plant capacity
credit or finance materials or components
other
Source: CBI Industrial Trends Survey 
1 = not below capacity, -1 = below capacity 
Source: CBI Industrial Trends Survey 
Respondents were able to give one or more 
responses, hence results do not sum to 100%. 
 
 
•  Total orders 
The ITS allows an analysis of whether the order books of small and large firms 
are above or below normal in volume terms. Chart 4 plots the answers to Survey Ques-
tion 5a. Both sets of firms generally seem to feel that their present order book is below 
normal in volume terms. This raises the question of what firms consider normal. Possi-
bly, the respondents' norm is related to their capacity. Small firms consistently feel more 
negative about their order books than do large firms. This is reflected in small firms 
having a lower overall mean value of –0.306, compared to large firms with a value of –
0.251. It is interesting to see how closely Charts 2 and 4 correlate with the trend in busi-  13
ness optimism shown in Chart 1; all three of these charts track the wider economic 
business cycle. 









































































Source: CBI Industrial Trends Survey 




•  Investment intentions 
In Survey Question 3, the ITS asks about respondents’ intentions for both 
buildings and plant and machinery investment over the coming 12 months compared 
with the preceding 12 months. As can be seen in Chart 5, intentions regarding buildings 
investment remains largely negative for both small and large firms throughout the pe-
riod, and both sets of data behave in a broadly similar manner. However, Chart 6 shows 
firms’ intentions regarding investment in plant and machinery is more volatile. Al-
though they also track each closely, large firms appear to be more positive about their 
investment intentions than are small firms.   14 
Chart 5:  
Investment intentions buildings 
Chart 6:  


































Source: CBI Industrial Trends Survey 
1 = more authorisations, 0 = same and -1 = less authori-
sations 
 
Source: CBI Industrial Trends Survey 




•  Motivation for capital expenditure  
Table 4 lists the main purposes that firms cite for their investment expenditures, as 
an answer to question 16b. As can be seen from the table, small firms cite the intention 
to increase efficiency considerably less than do larger firms, with only 46% ranking it as 
the most important reason for capital expenditure compared with 59% of larger firms. 
Instead, small firms cite replacement as a more important factor for capital expen-
diture than larger firms. It is noticeable that a sizeably higher proportion of smaller 
firms mention ‘not applicable’ than is the case for large firms. This could reflect indi-
visibilities, especially for large-scale capital expenditure, where small firms will invest 
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Table 4: Main reasons given for any expected capital expenditure on buildings,  
plant or machinery over the coming 12 months 
   Small Firms  Large Firms  All Firms 
To expand 
capacity 
17.1 19.5  18 
To increase 
efficiency 
45.5 58.7 50.4 
For 
replacement 
27.3 23.7 25.9 
Other  3.4 5.7 4.3 
N/A 13.2  2.9  9.4 
 
Source: CBI Industrial Trends Survey. Percentage of those firms reporting each reason as their 
most important 
 
•  Constraints on capital expenditure 
The question on constraints on investment is of key importance for our study. 
We therefore quote the exact wording here:  
Question 16c: What factors are likely to limit (wholly or partly) your capital 
expenditure authorisation over the next twelve months?  
(If you tick more than one factor, please rank in order of importance) 
ڤ  inadequate net return on proposed investment 
ڤ  shortage of internal finance 
ڤ  inability to raise external finance 
ڤ  cost of finance 
ڤ  uncertainty about demand 
ڤ  shortage of labour, including managerial and technical staff 
ڤ  other 
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Table 5: Small and large firms investment constraints 
     
Inadequate 















of labour  Other  N/A
Large Firms  Any rank  47.59%  20.23% 2.99% 9.44% 49.11% 4.92% 2.07% 7.38%
 Rank  1  37.01%  14.94% 1.37% 4.59% 36.81% 2.54% 1.81% 8.03%
Small Firms  Any rank  33.52%  18.12% 5.07% 11.34% 58.25% 6.20% 1.58% 9.77%
 Rank  1  22.95%  12.78% 2.30% 5.63% 49.01% 2.89% 1.44%  10.34%
Total data set  Any rank  38.71%  18.89% 4.30% 10.64% 54.88% 5.73% 1.76% 8.89%
 Rank  1  28.14%  13.58% 1.96% 5.25% 44.51% 2.76% 1.58% 9.49%
 
Source: CBI Industrial Trends Survey. Firms ranking the constraint as a limit on the capital expenditure 
authorisations, as a percentage of all firms, including those who did not answer the question at all. Re-
spondents were allowed to give one or more responses, hence shares do not sum to 100%. 
 
Table 5 shows both the overall frequency with which firms cite a given constraint 
(any rank) to investment expenditure and the frequency with which this constraint was 
given the first rank. Firms could name more than one constraint on capital expenditure, 
but they were asked to rank the importance of their constraints. We interpret the an-
swers to this question as information on marginal investment. For the entire sample, 
uncertainty about demand is the most common impediment mentioned by all firms. It is 
cited as the most significant constraint by 55% of all firms over the time period we 
studied. An interpretation of these figures in the light of theory, however, has to take 
into account the possibility that many firms focus only on ‘downside risks’, such as an 
unanticipated decrease in demand, rather than on uncertainty in the sense of imprecise 
expectations. For a recent review on the micro-econometric literature on investment and 
uncertainty see von Kalckreuth (2003a). The second most important constraint is inade-
quate net return, ranked by 39% of firms as their number one constraint. Other con-
straints seem to have been less important. Costs of finance was cited frequently in the 
early 1990s, but have been mentioned significantly less often since then. 
Table 5 also breaks down the complete data-set into small and large firms. These 
size classes show a number of differences in the importance given to the surveyed fac-
tors that could limit a firm’s capital expenditure. Demand uncertainty seems to be a 
more important issue for smaller firms than it is for larger firms. This is not implausible: 
a firm which combines many imperfectly correlated activities will find its overall de-
mand less volatile than does a firm with a smaller number of activities. Furthermore, it 
is conceivable that small firms are used to meet peak demands in larger firms' order   17
books and are cut out when orders fall. We also see that inadequate net return seems to 
bother large firms more than small firms.  
Turning to financial issues, we see that 5.1% of small firms cite the inability to 
raise external finance as a factor likely to limit their capital expenditure over the next 12 
months. However, it is also interesting to note that only 2.3% mentioned this particular 
factor as their foremost constraint. This compares with figures of 3.0% and 1.4% re-
spectively in the case of large firms. Therefore, although this severest form of financial 
constraint is more prevalent amongst small firms, the proportion affected is very low. 
Overall, it was the constraint least commonly cited by small firms. 
Small firms cite the shortage of internal finance less commonly than do large 
firms, with only 18.1% of small firms mentioning internal finance as a limiting factor 
compared with 20.2% of large firms. A finer breakdown (not shown) reveals that almost 
30% of the firms in the largest size category, with 5000 employees and over, claim to be 
constrained by the shortage of internal finance. This is somewhat surprising, but it is not 
impossible that the pressure for high and regular dividends is felt especially strongly by 
the larger quoted companies. On the other hand, some small firms might find it easier to 
draw on the private wealth of their owners in the event of liquidity shortages. The cost 
of finance is a concern for both small and large firms, with a slightly higher proportion 
of small firms citing it as their main limiting factor. 
   18 
Chart 7: Trend in investment constraints and an average investment balance over 


























































































Source: CBI Industrial Trends Survey 
% of firms ranking each constraint as the most important limit on the capital expenditure authorisations 
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Inability to raise external
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Cost of finance Large
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Source: CBI Industrial Trends Survey 
% of firms ranking each constraint as the most important limit on the capital expenditure authorisations 
 
 
Chart 7 plots the proportion of firms that cited the various constraints listed in 
Question 16c as relevant for their investment demand, together with the average balance 
of investment intentions. Chart 8 depicts the evolution in time for the three items that 
are related to financing, separately for large and small firms. Although all the financial   19
constraints on investment in the survey rank lower in importance for both small and 
large firms than do uncertainty about demand and an inadequate net return on proposed 
investment, it is interesting to look at the trend of such variables over time. As men-
tioned above, concerns about the cost of finance decreased dramatically for both catego-
ries of firms after the last recession in the early 1990s. This is especially noticeable for 
small firms, as 19% of small firms cited cost of finance as their main constraint on in-
vestment in January 1990 compared to only 3% in January 1993. By contrast, a shortage 
of internal finance appeared to peak as a concern for small firms in the mid-1990s and 
has become relatively less important for larger firms in recent years when compared 
with the early quarters in the data-set. This result should be interpreted in the light of the 
higher investment demand seen during the mid-1990s (see Chart 8) – if investment de-
mand is large, constraints imposed by internal finance are more likely to be binding. 
Concern about the inability to raise external finance has remained largely constant for 
both large and small firms, generally being mentioned by 2% to 3% of small firms 
throughout the 43 quarters covered by our data-set. 
Table 6: Variability and Persistence of Financial Constraints 
  Unconstr. in t  Constr. in t  Total 





















Source: CBI Industrial Trends Survey. Number and share of responding firms reporting either shortage of 
internal finance or inability to raise external finance as a factor likely to limit capital expenditure over the 
next twelve months. 
 
For inferential purposes, it is important to know whether there is sizeable individ-
ual variation in the financing constraints data. Table 6 conditions on whether in the pre-
ceding period a firm reported either shortage of internal finance or inability to raise ex-
ternal finance, and it shows the transition to the next period. It is easy to see that the 
reports on financial constraints are strongly autocorrelated. Among the firms that do not 
report financial constraints in a given period, a share of 87.6% will continue to do so in 
the next period, and 12.4% switch to reporting constraints. But only 33.3% of the firms 
that report financial constraints in one period will state that they are unconstrained next   20 
time, the remaining two-thirds will claim to be still constrained. However, the state of 
financial constraints is far from being determined by the state in the preceding period – 
there is lot of individual movement in both directions. 
4  Is there informational content in the financial constraints data? 
As highlighted in Section 3, a sizeable proportion of firms in the CBI Industrial 
Trends Survey state that their investment is constrained either by insufficient internal 
funds or by the inability to raise external finance. These statements are interesting and 
potentially very rich: as we shall see below, they permit the identification of the finan-
cial regime of a firm. Weighted averages of survey questions are often used for fore-
casting and evaluation purposes on a sectoral or macro level and in many cases turn out 
to be surprisingly accurate (see, for example, Chart 1 for the question on general opti-
mism). Mitchell, Smith and Weale (2002a, b) show that survey responses contain in-
formation that is useful in generating indicators of manufacturing output. Furthermore, 
they show that disaggregate indicators for output growth can outperform traditional ag-
gregate measures with respect to their predictive content. However, it is not clear a pri-
ori how well the survey responses reflect the individual financial situation of the an-
swering firm. Therefore, it is necessary to check the informational content of the state-
ments on financial constraints at a micro level. In other words, we want to see whether 
the statements on financial constraints relate to other information in the data-set in a 
way that is consistent with theory 
4.1  The endogeneity problem 
This, however, is no easy task. Capital accumulation and financial constraints are 
determined simultaneously: financial constraints depend not only on the financial situa-
tion of the firm, but also on the size of the planned investment.  
With complete markets and a type of uncertainty common to all agents, the net 
present value of a firm does not depend on the way it is financed. The Modigliani-
Miller separation theorem holds that a firm’s real capital allocation decision can be 
analysed independently of the financing decision – the structure of the asset side of the 
balance sheet is independent of the liability side. With asymmetric information, how-
ever, there will be a premium on external financing over and above a fair default pre-  21
mium which simply compensates for the fact that the debtor will not have to pay in 
certain states of nature. The creditor is less able than the debtor to evaluate the situation 
of the firm and the prospects of the investment project to be financed. The finance pre-
mium covers expected dead-weight losses caused by monitoring, costs of litigation, 
adverse selection and moral hazard. The important thing is that its size depends on the 
financial structure of the firm. Investment and the cost of external finance therefore are 
jointly endogenous. 
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Graph 1, adapted from Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999), shows that the 
costs of external finance depend on the difference between the actual capital demand 
and what can be financed internally. By means of this graph, we can interpret the re-
sponses to the questions on financial constraints in terms of three regimes which are 
ordered in a natural way: a state of no financial constraints, a state of limited internal 
finance (the firm needing external finance) and a state of unavailability of external fi-
nance. If a firm states that its capital expenditure authorisations are limited by a short-
age of internal finance, it is saying that it has to pay an external finance premium be-  22 
cause the internal resources are insufficient. And if it reports that no further external 
finance can be raised, the firm may find itself in the regime described by Stiglitz and 
Weiss (1981). In this case, the interest rate cannot be raised beyond a certain value, and 
the firm is credit-rationed. Under certain circumstances, this is the equilibrium outcome 
of a situation where the severity of the agency problems is a function of the interest rate 
itself. In Graph 1, the existence of such a regime would make the external costs of fi-
nance schedule break off at some maximum interest rate. 
Consider an equation describing the capital accumulation decision, such as  
Ii,t/Ki,t-1 = zi,t’β + γ fci,t + εi,t  (1) 
with Ii,t/Ki,t-1 as the investment rate, zi,t a vector of variables describing marginal profit-
ability of investment, and fci,t as a variable describing external finance premia or quan-
titative constraints. The error term εi,t will be correlated with the financial constraints 
variable via a second equation that explains the financial constraints indicators as a 
function of the financial structure and capital demand. The external finance premium 
will depend, among other things, on the inherited ratio of net debt to installed capital, 
Di,t-1/Ki,t-1 and financing needs Ii,t/Ki,t-1: 
fci,t = f(Di,t-1/Ki,t-1, Ii,t/Ki,t-1,...)+ ηi,t (2) 
This simultaneous relationship makes the predicted sign of γ in equation (1) indetermi-
nate under the conditions of binding financial constraints.
18 
If we had continuous variables describing the accumulation of capital, this prob-
lem could be resolved using instrumental variables techniques or GMM methods. Von 
Kalckreuth (2004) explores the informational content of German Ifo survey data using 
GMM estimators. Breitung, Chirinko and von Kalckreuth (2003) investigate the simul-
taneity of investment decision and financial conditions by estimating a VAR on a large 
panel of German manufacturing firms. However, Instrumental Variable analysis is made 
difficult by the fact that the ITS data on investment and expansion are qualitative: we 
                                                 
18  Let the external finance premium be a function of net debt to installed capital, Di,t/Ki,t-1. With CF as 
cash flow and Div as dividend payment, the equation of motion for net debt is given by Di,t = Di,t-1–
CFi,t+Ii,t+Divi,t. After solving for optimal dividend payment in terms of the predetermined variables, 
the equation for fci,t assumes the general form (2). On the relationship between investment demand and 
balance sheet pressure, see Benito and Young (2002).   23
know whether or not the firm expands or steps up investment, but not by how much. 
Further, there is no data on the financial structure in the ITS. 
We therefore want to test the informational content of the data on financial constraints 
by looking at a relationship where both lines of causality point in the same direction. To 
this end, we investigate the occurrence and the duration of spells of capacity restric-
tions. 
4.2  Occurrence and duration of capacity restrictions 
If there are adaptation costs such as delivery lags or time to build constraints, the 
move to a higher desired capital stock will be spread over several periods. In order to 
achieve tractability, it is often assumed that marginal adaptation costs increase linearly 
with the size of investment.
19 Second, the external finance premium might also be an 
increasing function of the investment intensity. Creditors might want to give finance in 
instalments, cutting the project into several phases, in order to monitor feasibility and 
the willingness of the management to comply with the terms of the credit contract. This 
may induce a sequential and ‘evolutionary’ development of a project from a smaller to a 
larger size even in cases where in a world without information asymmetry a massive 
parallel investment effort might have been optimal. In the extreme case, when a firm has 
no access to external finance, the amount of investment per period is quite simply lim-
ited by the firm’s cash flow. Von Kalckreuth (2004) provides a simple theoretical model 
of financial constraints and the speed of adjustment. The ITS survey gives us informa-
tion on whether or not a firm experiences capacity restrictions by asking the following 
question:  
Question 14: What factors are likely to limit your output over the next four 
months? (please leave completely blank if you have no limits to output) 
ڤ  orders or sales  ڤ  skilled labour  ڤ  other labour  ڤ  plant 
capacity 
ڤ  credit or 
finance 
ڤ  materials or 
components 
ڤ  other  
 
Both directions of causation between financial constraints and the expansion deci-
sion lead us to predict that a state of capacity restrictions is more probable and will be of 
                                                 
19  See Hayashi’s (1982) neoclassical micro-foundation of the Q model.   24 
longer duration if the respondent also reports financial constraints to investment. If a 
firm reports capacity restrictions, this is an indicator for a gap between the existing and 
the desired capital stock. Let us look first at the line of causation that runs from equation 
(2) to equation (1). A high fci,t in equation (1)  – induced by high indebtedness or a large 
financial shock ηi,t – will make that the investment corresponding to a given xi,t is 
spread over a longer period of time, inducing and prolonging capacity restrictions. On 
the other hand, with a given financial structure, a high realisation of zi,t or a large shock 
εi,t in equation (1) will not only lead to capacity restrictions and a long adjustment proc-
ess, but also trigger financial constraints in equation (2). Larger gaps take more time to 
fill, and this is reinforced when financial constraints are present. We can see that each of 
the two relationships alone is sufficient to explain a positive relationship between finan-
cial constraints and the frequency and duration of capacity restrictions.  
In the next paragraphs, we shall compare the occurrence and duration of capacity 
restrictions for constrained and unconstrained financing, with a particular emphasis on 
the distinction between small and large firms. Our analysis shows that the financial con-
straints data actually do have informational content at the micro level. 
4.3  Association analysis for capacity restrictions and financial constraints 
Table 7 compares the frequency of capacity restrictions for three groups of firms: 
those that do not seem to be limited by the lack of either internal or external finance 
(Group 1), those that complain about shortages of internal finance but not about the 
ability to raise external finance (Group 2) and, finally, those that report being rationed 
on the market for external finance (Group 3). Whereas only 12.99% of the first group 
claims to be capacity restricted, the corresponding figures are 22.52% of the second 
group and 19.17% of the third group. The two latter groups are clearly different from 
the first group. We perform three statistical tests of association: the well known Pearson 
test, a likelihood ratio test and Fisher's exact test, and all reject the null hypothesis of 
independence with a p-value of less than 0.0005.
20 The picture we can gather from com-
paring small and large firm in this respect (not shown) is essentially similar.  
                                                 
20  Given two discrete (multinomial) variables, all three tests focus on how strongly the realised shares for 
one variable, conditional on the values that the other variable may take, deviates from the overall 
shares. Pearson's test and the likelihood ratio test are easily calculated and rely on asymptotic proper-
ties of the test statistic: for large numbers their distribution converges against the Chi(2) with (r-1)(s-1)   25
Table 7: Association of Capacity Restrictions and Financial Constraints 
 
   Capacity restrictions 






































   Association Tests 
Pearson's test:     Chi2(2) =  431.39, P < 0.0005 
Likelihood ratio test:  Chi2(2) =  389.00, P < 0.0005 
Fisher's exact test:  P < 0.0005 
Source: CBI Industrial Trends Survey. Number and share of responding firms reporting shortage of inter-
nal finance or inability to raise external finance as a factor likely to limit capital expenditure over the next 
twelve months (rows) and number and share of firms reporting plant capacity as likely to limit output 
over the next 4 months (columns) . 
The association between the levels of the financial constraints and capacity restrictions 
might be the result of a special sensitivity to constraints in general on part of the indi-
vidual respondents. To put it differently: some individuals might have a special propen-
sity to complain. Therefore we want to condition on the state of capacity restrictions in 
the preceding period, thereby looking at changes of state. This examination also antici-
pates our duration analysis: by definition, a switch from an unrestricted to a restricted 
state initiates a spell of restricted capacity. If the restricted state is maintained, the spell 
goes on, and a reverse switch will end it.  
Table 8 performs the three above-mentioned non-parametric association tests separately 
for firms that reported capacity restrictions in the preceding period and those that did 
not. Generally, capacity restrictions are cited much more frequently when there were the 
same sort of restrictions in the previous quarter: Whereas only 7.2% of the unrestricted 
firms switch to the restricted state, 53.3% of the restricted firms remain restricted. How-
ever, under both conditions the probability of capacity restrictions clearly becomes 
higher when financial constraints are present. Again, the three association tests men-
tioned above reject the null hypothesis of independence with a p-value of less than 
0.0005.  
                                                                                                                                               
degrees of freedom, r being the number of rows and s being the number of columns in the contingency 
tables. Fisher's test exploits the exact distribution of the test statistic, but computation can take a very 
long time for larger tables. See, for example, Büning and Trenkler (1994) or any other monograph on 
non-parametric statistics.    26 
Table 8: All Firms - Association of Capacity Restrictions and Financial Con-
straints, conditional on state of capacity restrictions in the previous period 
 
Capacity restrictions  Case 1: No capacity 
restrictions 
in previous period 
 
































   Association Tests 
Pearson's test:     Chi2(2) =  137.18, P < 0.0005 
Likelihood ratio test:  Chi2(2) =  124.07, P < 0.0005 
Fisher's exact test:  P < 0.0005 
Capacity restrictions  Case 2: Capacity 
restrictions 
in previous period 
 
































   Association Tests 
Pearson's test:     Chi2(2) =  39.47, P < 0.0005 
Likelihood ratio test:  Chi2(2) =  39.76, P < 0.0005 
Fisher's exact test:  P < 0.0005 
Source: CBI Industrial Trends Survey. Number and share of responding firms reporting shortage of inter-
nal finance or inability to raise external finance as a factor likely to limit capital expenditure over the next 
twelve months (rows) and number and share of firms reporting plant capacity as likely to limit output 
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Table 9: Small Firms - Association of Capacity Restrictions and Financial Con-
straints, conditional on state of capacity restrictions in the previous period 
 
Capacity restrictions  Case 1: No capacity 
restrictions 
in previous period 
 
































   Association Tests 
Pearson's test:     Chi2(2) =  91.47, P < 0.0005 
Likelihood ratio test:  Chi2(2) =  82.16, P < 0.0005 
Fisher's exact test:  P < 0.0005 
Capacity restrictions  Case 2: Capacity 
restrictions 
in previous period 
 
































   Association Tests 
Pearson's test:     Chi2(2) =  37.82, P < 0.0005 
Likelihood ratio test:  Chi2(2) =  38.01, P < 0.0005 
Fisher's exact test:  P < 0.0005 
Source: CBI Industrial Trends Survey. Number and share of responding firms reporting shortage of inter-
nal finance or inability to raise external finance as a factor likely to limit capital expenditure over the next 
twelve months (rows) and number and share of firms reporting plant capacity as likely to limit output 
over the next 4 months (columns) . 
   28 
 
Table 10: Large Firms - Association of Capacity Restrictions and Financial 
Constraints, conditional on state of capacity restrictions in the previous period 
 
Capacity restrictions  Case 1: No capacity 
restrictions 
in previous period 
 
































   Association Tests 
Pearson's test:     Chi2(2) =  137.18, P < 0.0005 
Likelihood ratio test:  Chi2(2) =  124.07, P < 0.0005 
Fisher's exact test:  P < 0.0005 
Capacity restrictions  Case 2: Capacity 
restrictions 
in previous period 
 
































   Association Tests 
Pearson's test:     Chi2(2) =  6.06, P = 0.048 
Likelihood ratio test:  Chi2(2) =  6.10, P = 0.047 
Fisher's exact test:  P = 0.049 
 
Source: CBI Industrial Trends Survey. Number and share of responding firms reporting shortage of inter-
nal finance or inability to raise external finance as a factor likely to limit capital expenditure over the next 
twelve months (rows) and number and share of firms reporting plant capacity as likely to limit output 
over the next 4 months (columns) . 
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Tables 9 and 10 reveal an interesting difference between large and small firms. 
Among the firms that did not report capacity restrictions in the previous period, there is 
no clear size differential for transition rates. But among the restricted firms, a large firm 
will stay restricted  with a probability of 57.8% (Table 10, lower half), whereas it is 
only 49.9% for small firms (Table 9, lower half). A closer inspection of the two tables 
shows that most of that difference is due to different conditional probabilities of capac-
ity restrictions when there are no financial constraints. Transition probabilities of finan-
cially constrained large and small firms are similar. This might indicate that the duration 
of capacity restrictions is shorter for small firms. We also see that the transition rate is 
more affected by financial constraints when the firm is small: for large firms, the differ-
ence between financially constrained and unconstrained firms is less accentuated, albeit 
still significant.  
4.4  The design of the duration analysis 
We now proceed to consider the duration of states of restricted capacity. To the 
best of our knowledge, the duration of capacity restrictions has never been investigated 
before on a micro-econometric level. This makes our exercise interesting and worth-
while in its own right, as capacity restrictions may play an important role in the propa-
gation of inflationary shocks.
21 For a firm in this state, the probability of switching to 
the unrestricted state may depend on the duration that is already achieved. Such a con-
ditioning on time is called ‘ageing’, and the word itself makes the idea plain. Mortality 
among human beings is relatively high during the first months of life, and then drops 
sharply after a couple of years. In advanced age, mortality rises again and reaches ex-
treme levels at the right end of the scale.
22 
In order to estimate survival curves, we need to have information on the time 
when the period of constrained capacity began. We limit ourselves to contiguous strings 
of observations that start with a switch of the capacity restrictions variable from zero 
(no capacity restrictions reported) to one (output is likely to be limited by plant capacity 
                                                 
21  See Álvarez-Lois (2004) and Macklem (1997). 
22 The econometric analysis of duration data began only in the late 1970s’, see Heckman and Singer 
(1984) and Kiefer (1988) for compact overviews. Not only the statistical models, but also a good part 
of the terminology, have been borrowed from biostatistics. The classical focus of ‘survival analysis’ is 
the evaluation of survival times of human patients or animals after the contraction of a specific disease,   30 
during the next four months). The string is interrupted if either the state is left, i.e. the 
‘spell’ ends, or else if there is no further information on the firm. One missing survey is 
enough to cut the string off. For inferential reasons, we can use only those observations 
which are not censored immediately after entry. That is, after the initial switch from 
zero to one, we need at least one more consecutive observation on the firm if the string 
is to contain any information on duration other than that it was non-negative. The 
cleaned CBI survey data for the period between January 1989 and November 1999 
contain 49,244 observations on 5,169 firms. In this data-set, we observe 1,431 of such 
strings, with a total of 5,153 observations,
23 taken from 862 firms.  
We need to pay special attention to three important features of our data-set. First, 
our duration data are censored considerably. From our 1,431 cases, we observe the end 
of the spell 1,210 times, but in the remaining 221 spells the string is cut off by missing 
observations. In these cases, we know that the spell has lasted at least until the end of 
the string, and this information has to be used appropriately. Second, we have grouped 
data. We do not observe the end of the spell in continuous time, but only know that it 
falls in an interval between two discrete points. Our observations are quarterly, and the 
vast majority of observed periods of capacity restrictions are less than four quarters. 
This means that the granularity of our observations is rather high, and we believe that it 
would not be correct to use standard models and estimation procedures which assume 
observed duration times to be continuously distributed in time. Third, as already stated, 
we are working with a panel of survival time data. For many firms, we observe more 
than one spell. These cannot be assumed to be stochastically independent, and special 
care has to be taken with testing procedures. 
4.5 Kaplan-Maier  survival  curves 
We start by looking at the estimated survivor functions. A survivor function is de-
fined both for discrete and continuous distributions by the probability that the duration T 
exceeds a value t in its range, that is 
 
                                                                                                                                               
with the aim of testing the effects of medical treatments and other factors that might potentially be of 
relevance. 
23  This number of observations includes the initial zero and the initial 1 for each string.   31
() ( ) ∞ < < > = t t T P t F 0 ,    (3) 
For each hypothetical duration t, the survivor function gives the share of individuals 
with duration of t or more. In our context, the survivor function depicts the process of 
firms liberating themselves from capacity restrictions, once they have entered into this 
state. The survivor function gives the mass on the right tail of the distribution of dura-
tion times. This is convenient, because the right tail is the important component for the 
incorporation of right censoring. 
The Kaplan-Meier
24 (or product limit) estimator is a non-parametric maximum 
likelihood estimator of the survivor function. The estimator is given by 
( ) j
t j
t F λ ˆ 1 ˆ − =Π
≤





= λ ˆ  (4) 
The index j enumerates observed times to completion, i.e. time spans passed since the 
observational unit entered into the risk pool. We only observe firms at discrete intervals, 
therefore the j can be thought of as quarters. The  j λ ˆ  are estimated probabilities for the 
observational unit to complete at j, given that it has reached j-1, the last observed time 
to completion. Estimates of these conditional probabilities are obtained by dividing the 
observed number of completions, dj, by the number of observational units that have 
neither completed nor been censored before j.  
As can be seen, the survivor function is estimated recursively. The expression 
( ) λ ˆ 1−  is an estimation of the conditional probability that an individual ‘survives’ in the 
state, given that it has lasted until j–1. The unconditional probability that the duration is 
at least j is then computed as a product of all the contemporaneous and prior conditional 
survival probabilities. For this estimate to be unbiased, the censoring mechanism needs 
to be independent, that is, the completion probabilities of non-censored and censored 
individuals must be identical. This will be assumed throughout below. 
 
 
                                                 
24  For the derivation of the Kaplan-Meier estimator as a maximum likelihood estimator, see Kalbfleisch 
and Prentice (2002) and the Appendix to this paper.   32 
Table 11: Survivor Function and Completion Probabilities for the Entire Sample 
Time  Beg. Total  Completed  Net Lost  Completion Rates  Survivor 
Function 
Std. Dev. 
1 1431  856  133  0.5982  0.4018  0.0138 
2  442 216 43  0.4887  0.2055  0.0122 
3 183  63  16  0.3443  0.1347  0.0106 
4 104  40  11  0.3846  0.0829  0.0090 
5  53 12 7  0.2264  0.0641  0.0083 
6  34 13 4  0.3824  0.0396  0.0074 
7 17  3  2  0.1765  0.0326  0.0072 
8 12  3  3  0.2500  0.0245  0.0061 
9  6 3 0  0.5000  0.0122  . 
 
 
Table 12: Composition of Sub-Samples 
Sub-Sample  No. of experiences  Times at risk  Incidence 
rates 
All Firms  1,431  2,291  0.528 
Small Firms  887  1,365  0.559 
Large Firms  544  926  0.482 
Shortage of int. finance  363  625  0.467 
No shortage of int. finance  1,068  1,666  0.551 
Shortage of int. or ext. finance  407  703  0.472 
No shortage of int. or ext. finance  1,024  1,588  0.553 
 
Table 11 not only describes termination and censoring over time, but also gives the nu-
merical values for the survivorship and completion rates in the entire sample. The first 
column, time, is the number of quarters after the original switch from unconstrained to 
constrained. If, for example, the capacity state of a firm switches from unrestricted to 
restricted in the third quarter 1991, then for this firm the fourth quarter 1991 assumes 
the value of 1. The second column gives the number of firms ‘at risk’, for which we 
have information in this duration interval. The third column gives the number of com-
pletions, the fourth column the number of firms censored in this quarter, on which there 
is no further information thereafter. The sixth column is the estimated Kaplan-Meier 
survivor function, based on the estimated hazard rates in the fifth column according to 
Equation (4). According to this estimate, about 40% of firms that start out with capacity   33
restrictions remain in this state for more than one quarter, 20% for more than two quar-
ters, etc. After the fifth quarter, the survivor function has dropped to 6.4%. The longest 
observed duration is completed after 13 quarters. During the first three quarters, com-
pletion probabilities seem to be falling, i.e. there is negative age dependence. The more 
time a firm has spent in a state of constrained capacity, the less likely it is to leave in the 
next quarter. From the fourth quarter on, the relationship ceases to be monotonic. The 
size of the sample, on which duration information is based, decreases rapidly with time. 
After the fifth quarter, not more than 3.7% of the original set of firms is left in the sam-
ple. It therefore seems inappropriate to draw any conclusions from survival times larger 
than that. The last column gives the standard deviation of the survivor function, taking 
into account the stochastic dependence of the duration experiences for a given firm. The 
standard deviations are simulated on the basis of a maximum likelihood estimation of 
the parameters – see the Appendix to this paper – using 20,000 replications. Numeri-
cally, they differ only very slightly from what is obtained assuming all duration experi-
ences to be independent. The curve of the survival function given in Table 11 is plotted 
as Graph 2. 
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We want to compare the survivor experiences for various sub-samples. The rela-
tive sizes of the groups and some global statistics are given in Table 12. Graph 3 com-
pares the duration experiences of small and large firms. Among the total number of ca-
pacity restrictions experiences, 887 were by small firms (with less than 200 employees) 
and 544 by large firms (200 employees and more). The survival curve of small firms is 
always beneath that of the larger firms. That is, large firms take longer than small firms 
to complete their spells of capacity restrictions.  
 





















Kaplan-Meier survival estimates, by firm size
analysis time








    
It is interesting to speculate about possible reasons. One explanation is that larger firms 
might be hit by disproportionately larger demand shocks, ie shocks that are larger rela-
tive to their size. This does not seem immediately plausible; the law of large numbers 
should help to even out demand volatility for firms with larger and more diversified 
markets. However, it is conceivable that small firms cope with the volatility of market 
demand by tying themselves to larger firms and groups, in exchange for an explicit or 
implicit insurance, thus smoothing their order book situation. Analogous strategies have 
been modelled to explain relationship banking in the context of firm finance, or implicit 
contracts in labour markets. Then, of course, it may also be the case that with their flat 
hierarchies and low co-ordination costs, small firms are more nimble and flexible in 
coping with demand shocks of a given size than are the more bureaucratic large firms. A   35
third potential reason for the slower response of large firms is external supply con-
straints in the machinery production industry. If one firm accounts for a large share of 
total demand for a certain specialised capital good, its rate of increase in capacity will 
be constrained by the capacity of the capital goods producers – inverting the accelerator 
principle. Presumably, large firms are in this situation more often.  
Next we wish to look at survival experiences by financially constrained and un-
constrained firms. The state is measured at the start of the spell. As before, there are two 
natural ways analytically to distinguish financially constrained and unconstrained firms. 
First, we can group a firm as financially constrained if it reports that it has to scale 
down investment because of insufficient internal funds. Second, we can classify it as 
financially constrained if it cites either shortages of internal finance or the inability to 
obtain external finance. The difference between the two groupings is in those 44 spells 
where firms cite the inability to obtain external finance as a limitation to investment, 
without indicating shortages of internal finance at the same time. As such a pattern is 
incompatible with the standard pecking order view of corporate finance under financial 
constraints or the natural ordering that results from costly monitoring models as shown 
in Graph 1, we prefer the less ambivalent first grouping.  
Ultimately, 172 among the 1,431 spells start with the firm citing “costs of fi-
nance” as an impediment to investment. This answer might be considered a function of 
both the classical user costs of capital and the external finance premium. Among the 
172 spells thus characterised, 64 cases are also characterised by lack of internal finance 
or inability to raise external finance. In the remaining 108 cases, costs of finance are 
named as an impediment without either lack of internal finance or the inability to obtain 
external finance being cited. Whereas the former configuration is consistent with a firm 
that has run out of internal finance and now faces a high external finance premium, the 
latter group seems to indicate high opportunity costs. Internal funds are available, but 
there is a higher yield for some alternative use. Chart 8 shows that ‘costs of finance’ 
were cited widely during the period of high interest rates at the beginning of the 1990s 
whereas they have lost almost all importance since. According to the classical user cost 
mechanism,
25 opportunity costs are important for determining the “desired” capital 
                                                 
25 See, among others, Jorgenson (1963), Hall and Jorgenson (1967), and Eisner and Nadiri (1968).   36 
stock and thus whether or not there is net investment demand, given the current capital 
stock inherited from the previous period. This gap is controlled for by conditioning on 
firms that state capacity restrictions. What we are interested in, however, is whether fi-
nancially constrained firms reach their target later. We will therefore not use ‘costs of 
finance’ as an indicator for financial constraints in the body of our analysis. Lack of 
internal finance as a sorting criterion will qualify as constrained the 64 cases that are 
consistent with an interpretation in terms of an elevated external finance premium, but 
not the remaining 108 spells. However, see Section 4.6 below for additional estimation 
results on the basis of a ‘cost of finance’ classification. 












Graph 4 depicts the results for the first criterion (shortage of internal finance) for 
the whole sample. The survival curve for financially unconstrained firms is everywhere 
beneath the curve for the financially constrained firms. This means the unconstrained 
firms are able to complete their spell of restricted capacity faster than the constrained 
firms. It is convenient to point out again that there are two competing causal explana-
tions for this difference. For a given size of the capacity gap, financial constrained firms 
might take longer to fill it. On the other hand, firms with a larger capacity gap (and ac-
cordingly higher financing needs) might be more likely to report financial constraints. 
  Kaplan-Meier survival estimates, by financial constraints. 
analysis time 
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Comparing the survival curves is essentially a test on whether at least one of these hy-
potheses is true.  
Graph 5: 
Small Firms Only:  












Large Firms Only:  










Small firms only: Kaplan-Meier survival estimates, by fin. constr.
analysis time
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         It is instructive to look at the effect of financial constraints separately for small 
and for large firms. Graph 5 shows constrained and unconstrained small firms, and 
Graph 6 performs the same comparison for large firms. For both sub-samples, the curve 
for constrained firms is situated above the curve for unconstrained firms, as is expected. 
The graphs for the second criterion look essentially similar. Eyeballing suggests that the 
difference is more marked for small firms. It will be necessary to examine this and other 
differences statistically.  
4.6  A proportional hazard (Cox) model of duration 
In order to test the effect of size and financial constraints on the duration of ca-
pacity restrictions, we need to impose some structure. Let  ( ) 2 1,x x x =  be a two dimen-
sional vector of indicator variables for size and financial constraints. Specifically,  1 1 = x  
indicates large size, and  1 2 = x  a state of financial constraints at the beginning of the 
spell. As we have little a priori information about the underlying process, we do not 
want to restrict the form of the baseline survival function that corresponds to  () 0 , 0 = x , 
the case of a small firm without financial constraints. In what follows, we explicitly 
recognise (1) that duration is distributed continuously over time, and (2) the measure-
ment of the capacity restrictions for a given unit is taken at discrete interval (quarters), j 
= 1, 2, ... k.
26 Let  ( ) i x t, λ  be the hazard for a unit with characteristics  i x  at time t, de-
fined as 
() () h x t T h t T t P x t i h , lim ,
0 ≥ + < ≤ =
→ λ  (5) 
 
The hazard is the instantaneous rate at which spells are completed by units that 
have lasted until time t, defined in the same way as a mortality rate in demographics or a 
failure rate in the statistical theory of capital stock dynamics (see Appendix 2 for the 
details). We want to assume that the characteristics x relate to the hazard rate in a 
proportional fashion: 
                                                 
26  The assumption of absolutely continuous time is made only for expositional convenience. A discrete 
time concept would not invalidate any of our results, after we have redefined the hazard rate in t as the 
conditional probability that the spell is completed in t+1, conditional on it having lasted until t. It is 
possible to conduct duration analysis with distributions of T that have both discrete and continuous 
portions. See Kalbfleisch and Prentice (2002) for a systematic approach.    39
() ( )() β λ λ ' exp , 0 i x t x t ⋅ =    (6) 
 
with  β being a vector of coefficients that needs to be estimated. The hazard ratio be-
tween an individual with characteristics  i x  and the baseline case is given by  () β ' exp i x , 
which is approximately  β + 1  for small β. The hazard ratios between two individuals 
with characteristics  1 x  and  0 x  are calculated as  ( ) [ ] β 0 1 exp x x − . Equation (6) constitutes 
the model of proportional hazard, developed by Cox (1972). In this set-up, the baseline 
hazard remains completely unspecified, which is why the proportional hazard model 
figures among the semi-parametric approaches. 
We assume that the spells of different firms are independent events and that the 
censoring mechanism is independent of the state of the firm. We can write the probabil-
ity for the completion of a spell to be registered after j surveys as a product of condi-
tional probabilities. This allows us to derive a likelihood function that contains β as well 
as further (incidental) parameters describing, for the baseline case, the conditional prob-
ability of completing in the time interval between  1 − j  and  j , given that  1 − j  has been 
reached. The Appendix contains the full details and a derivation. The likelihood func-
tion can be shown to be identical to the likelihood function for a Bernoulli-experiment 
with probabilities that depend on time as well as on  i x  by means of a standard link 
function. The parameter estimates are asymptotically normally distributed. The panel 
nature of the data is taken into account by computing robust standard errors, with clus-
ters defined by the firm identity.   40 
 
Table 13: ML Estimation of a Proportional Hazard Model with Grouped Panel Data 
Coefficient  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
large 














































   

























         
Duration time 
dummies 
9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
Sector 
dummies 
no no no no no no no 
Dummies for 
time origin of 
spells 
no no no no no no no 
No. of spells 
























Cox duration model with grouped data for spells of capacity restrictions, estimated as a binary regression 
model using the complementary log-log function as link function, see the Appendix for details. A spell is 
classified as pertaining to a financially constrained firm if, at the time when the spell starts, the firm re-
ports financial constraints. The dummy variable fin(1) takes a value of 1 if a firm reports shortage of 
internal finance in the answer to question 16c, else it is zero. The dummy variable fin(2) takes a value of 
1 if the firm reports either shortage of internal finance or inability to raise external finance, else it is zero. 
Likewise, a spell is classified as belonging to a large firm if the firm has 200 employees or more at the 
beginning of the spell. One observation had to be dropped because the longest duration interval (13 quar-
ters) predicts the event perfectly. The first entry gives the estimated coefficients. The term in curly brack-
ets translates this coefficient into a hazard ratio. The third figure, in round brackets, indicates the robust 
standard deviations, taking into account stochastic dependence between spells generated by the same 
firm. The last entry, in square brackets, gives the z statistic for statistical significance: *** significant at 
the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level.  
   41
Table 13 contains the Maximum Likelihood estimations for a Cox model with two 
covariates: size and an indicator variable for the presence of financial constraints. As 
explained above, we use two alternative definitions of financial constraints. The dummy 
variable fin(1) takes a value of 1 to indicate that the firm cites insufficient internal fi-
nance at the outset of the spell. The dummy variable fin(2) will be 1 if the firm cites 
either insufficient internal finance or the inability to raise external finance. The respec-
tive classification is maintained during the entire spell. 
In each cell, the first figure gives the estimated coefficients. Below, in curly 
brackets, this value is translated into a hazard ratio. Column (1), for example, compares 
the hazard rates for small and large firms. The hazard rate of a large firm is exp(–0.183) 
times the hazard ratio of a small firm, meaning that large firms are leaving the state of 
restricted capacity at a rate which is only about 83.3% that of a small firm. The third 
figure, in round brackets, indicates the robust standard deviations, taking into account 
stochastic dependence between spells generated by the same firm. The last entry, in 
square brackets, gives the z statistic for statistical significance: under the null hypothesis 
of no differences, the estimated coefficient divided by its standard error is asymptoti-
cally a standard normal variate. Investigating the table, we see that the lack of internal 
finance lowers the hazard rate to approximately the same extent as large size: the hazard 
rate for a constrained firm is only 82.6% of an unconstrained firm, meaning a longer 
duration of the restriction experience. This remains true if we consider both characteris-
tics at the same time. In Column (4), we introduce an interaction term, thereby allowing 
the sensitivity of large firms with respect to financial constraints to be different from 
that of small firms. In this regression, we can compare constrained small firms with 
unconstrained small firms using the fin(1)  coefficient. Its value is 0.260, which is 
equivalent to a hazard ratio of 0.771%. The hazard ratio of a large constrained firm (as 
opposed to a large unconstrained firm) is given by the sum of the fin(1) coefficient and 
the coefficient of the interaction term. We see that this coefficient is smaller, the esti-
mated hazard ratio for large firms is only exp(–0.260+0.170) = 0.915. Furthermore, this 
value is not significantly different from zero. Performing a Wald-test on whether the 
sum of the coefficients on fin(1) and the interaction term is zero, we obtain a value of 
the  () 1
2 χ -statistic of 0.58, which is equivalent to a p-value of just 0.45. However, the 
difference in the sensitivity between small and large firms, given by the coefficient of   42 
the interaction term, is itself not significant. The last three columns of Table 13 give us 
the corresponding estimates with respect to our second indicator of financial constraints, 
fin(2). The picture is essentially similar, although the measured difference in the sensi-
tivity between small and large firms is somewhat smaller.  
It may be argued that the detected differences between small and large firm may 
be sector specific. As firm size (and possibly financial constraints) may be sector spe-
cific too, we want to control for sectoral differences in order to avoid a missing variable 
bias. Table 14 repeats the estimates explained above, adding 20 dummies for 2 digit SIC 
sectors. This leads to a slight reduction in size effect: the hazard rate goes down from 
0.833 to 0.855. In the estimation featuring a size dummy, the fin(1) dummy and the in-
teraction term, large size will lower the hazard rate by about 19%, lack of internal fi-
nance will depress it by almost 25%, but the interaction term, although still insignificant 
by itself, will neutralise almost the entire effect of financial constraints for large firms. 
Again, the estimates using the second criterion for financial constraints are very similar, 
although the measured effects seem less strong. 
A third set of estimates, collected in Table 15, controls for the position in the 
business cycle, by including dummies for the time of the start of the spell. This is done 
in order to account for a possible dependence of duration on the general state of the 
economy. In a time of depression, investors might be less inclined to close capacity 
gaps. At the same time, internal financial resources might be scarcer and external fi-
nance might be more difficult to obtain. In our estimates, adding the controls for the 
business cycle situation makes the size effects come out more clearly, whereas the 
measured effects of financial constraints are somewhat smaller, as predicted. In our pre-
ferred estimate, which includes an interaction term, both characteristics lower the haz-
ard rate by about 22 % with respect to the baseline case. These two values are highly 
significant. For large firms, the interaction term lowers the financial constraints sensi-
tivity by about one half. The hazard rate of a constrained large firm versus an uncon-
strained firm is measured at 91.6. Statistically, this is not significant – the  () 1
2 χ -statis-
tic yields a value of 0.94, corresponding to a p-value of 0.33. 
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Table 14: ML Estimation of a Proportional Hazard Model with Grouped Panel Data 
Controlling for Sector Heterogeneity 
Coefficient  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
large 
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Duration time 
dummies 
9  9 9 9 9 9 9 
Sector  dummies  20  20 20 20 20 20 20 
Dummies for 
time origin of 
spells 
no  no no no no no no 
No. of spells 
























Cox duration model with grouped data for spells of capacity restrictions, estimated as a binary regression 
model using the complementary log-log function as link function, see the Appendix for details. A spell is 
classified as pertaining to a financially constrained firm if, at the time when the spell starts, the firm re-
ports financial constraints. The dummy variable fin(1) takes a value of 1 if a firm reports shortage of 
internal finance in the answer to question 16c, else it is zero. The dummy variable fin(2) takes a value of 
1 if the firm reports either shortage of internal finance or inability to raise external finance, else it is zero. 
Likewise, a spell is classified as belonging to a large firm if the firm has 200 employees or more at the 
beginning of the spell. Additionally, the regressions summarised in this table use 20 dummies represent-
ing SIC (1980) 2 digit sectors. One observation had to be dropped because the longest duration interval 
(13 quarters) predicts the event perfectly. Two more observations and one sector (manufacturing of office 
machinery and data processing) were dropped because the sector dummy predicts the event perfectly. The 
first entry gives the estimated coefficients. The term in curly brackets translates this coefficient into a 
hazard ratio. The third figure, in round brackets, indicates the robust standard deviations, taking into ac-
count stochastic dependence between spells generated by the same firm. The last entry, in square brack-
ets, gives the z statistic for statistical significance: *** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% 
level.   44 
 
Table 15: ML Estimation of a Proportional Hazard Model with Grouped Panel Data 
Controlling for Sector Heterogeneity and Business Cycle Effects 
Coefficient  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) 
large 
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Duration time 
dummies 
9 9  9  9 9  9 9 
Sector dummies  20  20  20  20 20  20 20 
Dummies for 
time origin of 
spells 
41 41  41  41 41  41 41 
No. of spells 
























Cox duration model with grouped data for spells of capacity restrictions, estimated as a binary regression 
model using the complementary log-log function as link function, see the Appendix for details. A spell is 
classified as pertaining to a financially constrained firm if, at the time when the spell starts, the firm re-
ports financial constraints. The dummy variable fin(1) takes a value of 1 if a firm reports shortage of 
internal finance in the answer to question 16c, else it is zero. The dummy variable fin(2) takes a value of 
1 if the firm reports either shortage of internal finance or inability to raise external finance, else it is zero. 
Likewise, a spell is classified as belonging to a large firm if the firm has 200 employees or more at the 
beginning of the spell. Additionally, the regressions summarised in this table use 20 dummies represent-
ing SIC (1980) 2 digit sectors, as well as 41 dummies indicating the time origin of the spell. One obser-
vation had to be dropped because the longest duration interval (13 quarters) predicts the event perfectly. 
Two more observations and one sector (manufacturing of office machinery and data processing) were 
dropped because the sector dummy predicts the event perfectly. The first entry gives the estimated coeffi-
cients. The term in curly brackets translates this coefficient into a hazard ratio. The third figure, in round 
brackets, indicates the robust standard deviations, taking into account stochastic dependence between 
spells generated by the same firm. The last entry, in square brackets, gives the z statistic for statistical sig-
nificance: *** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level. 
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Additionally, we have run an estimation that classifies a spell as financially con-
strained not only if a firm reports either lack of internal finance or the inability to obtain 
external finance, but also if ‘cost of finance’ are cited as an impediment to more invest-
ment. The use of time dummies in the current estimation context allows to neutralise at 
least partly the strong cyclical dependence of the ‘cost of finance’ statements. Using this 
indicator, fin(3), financial constraints are no longer significant on a 5% level. For a 
model with financial constraints only, analogous to column (5) in Table 15, we obtain a 
coefficient of –0.12 with a z-value of 1.88 (p=0.060). Taking into account both financial 
constraints and size, as in column (6) of Table 15, the coefficient is –0.12, with a z-
value of –1.92 (p=0.055). Adding an interaction term, as in column (7) of Table 15, we 
estimate a fin(3) coefficient of –0.14, with a z-value of –1.72 (p=0.085). We do not 
think, however, that fin(3) is an adequate indicator for financial constraints. As dis-
cussed in paragraph 4.5 already, the difference between fin(2) and fin(3) is given by 
those firms that report costs of finance as impediments for investment without reporting 
shortage of internal finance or the inability to obtain external finance at the same time. 
This pattern is consistent with firms that have a more profitable alternative use for their 
internal resources, such as paying back debt. In this case, the classical user cost mecha-
nism predicts a decrease of the desired capital stock. Thus there is no reason to expect 
that the spell of restricted capacity, indicating a difference between desired and installed 
capacity, will be very long for those firms. 
The estimates for large and for small firms in Table 11, 12 and 13 are not inde-
pendent, as the coefficients on the duration time dummies are restricted to be identical.
27 
We want to repeat the comparison by estimating a proportional hazards model sepa-
rately for large and for small firms. This is equivalent to including interaction terms for 
time dummies in the previous regressions. As we want to economise on degrees of free-
dom, we perform this regression only for the basic model without additional dummies 
indicating sector or date of spell origin. The results, collected in Table 16, do not differ 
perceptibly from what has been seen before: with small firms, the presence of financial 
constraints leads us to predict a smaller hazard and a longer duration of the capacity 
                                                 
27  The time dummies are related to the conditional probabilities of completing for the baseline group, see 
Appendix 2.   46 
restrictions experience. For large firms, the estimated difference points in the same di-
rection, but it is smaller and not significantly different from zero.  
 
Table 16: Maximum Likelihood Estimation of a Proportional Hazard Model with 




























    












Duration  time  dummies 9 9  9 9 9  9 
No. of spells 
No. of firms 



















Cox duration model with grouped data for spells of capacity restrictions, estimated as a binary regression 
model using the complementary log-log function as link function, see the Appendix for details. A spell is 
classified as pertaining to a financially constrained firm if, at the time when the spell starts, the firm re-
ports financial constraints. The dummy variable fin(1) takes a value of 1 if a firm reports shortage of 
internal finance in the answer to question 16c, else it is zero. The dummy variable fin(2) takes a value of 
1 if the firm reports either shortage of internal finance or inability to raise external finance, else it is zero. 
Likewise, a spell is classified as belonging to a large firm if the firm has 200 employees or more at the 
beginning of the spell. One observation had to be dropped because the longest duration interval (13 quar-
ters) predicts the event perfectly. The first entry gives the estimated coefficients. The term in curly brack-
ets translates this coefficient into a hazard ratio. The third figure, in round brackets, indicates the robust 
standard deviations, taking into account stochastic dependence between spells generated by the same 
firm. The last entry, in square brackets, gives the z statistic for statistical significance: *** significant at 
the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level. 
 
The size of the sample for our duration analysis is affected by the fact that we 
need to observe the start of the spell in order to take proper account of ageing. What if 
ageing is absent or unimportant, the hazard function memoryless? We could make use 
of all the strings that contain capacity restrictions and at least one further observation. 
And a look on Table 11 does not seem to make the assumption of a constant completion 
rate too harsh.  
As a matter of fact, this brings us back to the analysis in section 4.3, Tables 8, 9 
and 10. The lower half of these tables look at the frequency of restricted and non-re-
stricted capacity, given that there were capacity restrictions in the previous period, sepa-  47
rately for firms that do report financial constraints and those that do not. Under the as-
sumptions made above, these are estimates of the conditional transition probabilities, 
and the distribution of the duration of spells would simply be geometric. And the way to 
tell whether those transition probabilities are different is just the three tests we have per-
formed. For both types of firms, financial constraints prove to be significant for the 
transition to the unconstrained state, but the difference between the estimated condi-
tional probabilities effect was clearly lower for the large firms. 
As a whole, our Cox regressions give us two statistically significant results and a 
consistent overall pattern. Holding everything else constant, size clearly has an effect on 
the duration of capacity restrictions. Hazard rates for large firms are about 20%-25% 
lower compared to small firms. Second, for small firms at least, financial constraints 
according to either of our two definitions make a difference. For a constrained small 
firm, the hazard is between 24% and 29% smaller than for an unconstrained small firm. 
For large firms, on the other hand, we do not find a statistically significant difference 
between constrained and unconstrained firms. We do not think that it is justified to con-
clude that financial constraints are unimportant or uninformative for larger firms. The 
results from the association analysis in Section 4 do not support this interpretation. It is 
quite possible that our sample size is not big enough to deliver significant results for our 
sub-sample of larger firms. The sensitivity difference between the two groups is every-
where insignificant. However, the overall pattern of a lower, but still positive depend-
ence of duration on financial constraints is suggestive.  
There are various possible interpretations for this “difference in differences”. 
First, standard theory suggests that financial constraints might mean less of a restriction 
for larger firms, especially when those are given by “lack of internal finance”. It may be 
easier and cheaper for them to obtain external finance, not only from banks and share-
holders, but also from suppliers, in the form of trade credit. However, it is also conceiv-
able that large firms find it easier to absorb a given increase in financing costs by 
adapting other real activities, eg by decumulating inventories (when they can rely on 
being supplied with priority), postponing hiring, scaling down training, or turning to 
renting and leasing capital goods.
28 Finally, the costs of not being able to satisfy de-
                                                 
28 A referee pointed this possibility out to us.    48 
mand for an extended time can be considerable for a large monopolist who needs to 
deter potential competitors from market entry, as compared to small firms for which the 
perfect competition paradigm will often be better suited. 
5  Conclusion and Outlook 
In our empirical work, we have focussed on two questions. First, we ask whether 
there is informational content in the CBI data on financial constraints, as a precondition 
to using them for monitoring purposes. This has led us to investigate the interactions 
between financial constraints, defined as a shortage of internal finance or the inability to 
raise external finance, and capacity restrictions, signalling a gap between the actual and 
desired capital stock. Our method of validating survey data has never been used before 
in the literature. Second, we use the data set to compare the importance of financial con-
straints for small and large firms. The CBI data set offers a unique opportunity for such 
comparisons.  
Our association and duration analysis shows that indeed there is informational 
content in the CBI data on financial constraints – as theoretically expected, financially 
constrained firms are more often capacity restricted and they take longer to close capac-
ity gaps than unconstrained firms. This important result means we can take our survey 
information seriously. They indicate that financial constraints and real activity are in-
deed interrelated. Survey information on the ups and downs of financial constraints in-
dicators can therefore be a potentially valuable policy tool.  
Quantitatively, the differences between financially constrained and unconstrained 
firms are clear, but not large: a financially constrained firm will leave the state of ca-
pacity restrictions at a rate that is about 20% lower than for a firm that does not report 
financial constraints.  
Concerning the importance of financial constraints for small and large firms, the 
descriptive statistics – somewhat surprisingly – do not show any clear distinction. The 
analysis of association indicates that a small firm with capacity restrictions will leave 
this state quicker than a large firm, and that financial constraints seem to matter more. 
This is entirely consistent with our formal duration analysis: small firms are able to 
close their capacity gaps faster. For small firms, however, financial constraints make a   49
clear difference: shortage of internal finance or the inability to raise external finance 
significantly prolong their spells of capacity restrictions. For larger firms, the measured 
effect is positive, too, but insignificant. As the association analysis has shown statisti-
cally significant differences between financially constrained and unconstrained large 
firms, we conclude that the relationship between financial constraints and the speed of 
adjustment is weaker for larger firms, but not absent.  
This interesting pattern – small firms adapting faster in general, but with a speed 
that is more closely related to financial conditions, might be the basis for further theo-
retical and empirical work on comparative advantages of firms belonging to different 
size classes: we should expect to find small firms in sectors where there is a premium 
for high speed of adjustment. And they can be at a relative disadvantage in areas with 
large peaks in the demand for finance or discontinuous cash flows, e.g. because of long 
gestation lags.  
The precise nature of the relationship between the real and the financial spheres 
remains to be worked out. The measured differences between firms that report financial 
constraints, and those that do not, will partly be due to the effects that investment has on 
the firms’ balance sheets. Real investment decisions may certainly cause financial con-
straints, and on the other hand those financial constraints may slow down or prevent 
expansion plans. Further research aims at identifying the two directions of causation 
using a structural approach. 
Appendix 1: A maximum likelihood estimator for the proportional 
hazard model with censored grouped panel data 
As has already been discussed, a very important feature of our data-set is that the 
observations are grouped. The observational units are surveyed in certain intervals and 
if there is a status change, we get to know only the left and the right boundary for the 
date when the change took place. And as the typical duration experience (spell) only 
lasts a few quarters, we have to take this limitation very seriously.  
This makes it impossible to use many of the standard procedures that assume a 
continuous flow of information. In a certain sense, however, the restriction also makes 
life easier. As we do not see what happens in between two surveys, all survivor func-  50 
tions that yield the same pattern of probability masses on the intervals are observation-
ally equivalent. It is only this pattern that counts for inferential purposes. And as there 
are not too many quarters, the pattern can be parameterised relatively easily.  
Below, we think of the duration as distributed in continuous time. Information, 
however, arrives at discrete points and is supposed to cover the interval between two 
observations. Our derivation of a maximum likelihood estimator for the case of grouped 
data relies heavily on Hosmer and Lemeshow (1999), Sect. 7.4 (but also see Kalbfleisch 
and Prentice (2002), Sect. 5.8 for a more general exposition). 
In Equation (5), the hazard function has been defined as the instantaneous rate at 
which spells are completed by units that have lasted until time t, just like a mortality 
rate in demographic analysis. Let  ) , ( x t f  be the (continuous) density of duration t and 
) , ( x t S  the survivor function, indicating the probability of duration of at least t, being 
the probability mass on the right tail of the distribution. Then the hazard function may 
be written as 
() ) , ( log
) , (
) , (





x t = = λ    (A.1) 
The hazard function completely determines the distribution. In survival analysis, the 
most widely used model to analyse the influence of covariates x is the proportional haz-
ard model introduced into the literature by Cox (1972). Given a set of covariates and a 
vector of parameters β, the constituting assumption is  
() ( ) () x'β t x t exp , 0 ⋅ = λ λ  .  (A.2) 
The hazard function for an individual with covariates x differs from a baseline hazard 
0 λ  by a multiple  () x'β exp  that may or may not be constant. Most importantly for 
estimation purposes, the baseline hazard remains completely unspecified. Therefore, the 
Cox model is classified as a semi-parametric approach. The substantive content of the 
Cox assumption rests in the hazard ratio for two units with covariates  0 x  and  1 x : 
()





1 exp − =  .  (A.3)   51
We want to develop a maximum likelihood procedure for the estimation of a propor-
tional hazard model with censored grouped panel data. In our set-up, measurement is 
taken at certain intervals: {} k j , , 2 , 1 K = . For all individual spells i, we define a censor-
ing variable  i c  that takes the value  1 = i c  if the end of the duration is observed, and 
0 = i c  if not. Let  i l t =  be the time when the spell i is last observed. Calculating the 
probability of a given duration experience, we have to distinguish two cases. If  1 = i c  
(not censored), we know that the duration was completed by  i l t = , and the completion 
event must have occurred somewhere in the interval between  1 − i l  and  i l . That means: 
() ( ) β β , , , , 1 i i i i i x l S x l S P − − = for   1 = i c  .  (A.4) 
If 0 = i c , right censoring occurs in  i l t = . Up to the last observation, the event has not 
occurred, and the probability for this outcome is:  
() β , , i i i x l S P =  .  (A.5) 
This fundamental distinction is typical for estimation with censored data; see, for exam-
ple, Maddala (1983), Chapter 6, or Wooldridge (2002), Chapters 16 and 20. Assuming 
for a moment that the spells are independent, we may write the likelihood function as  








































































The seemingly unwieldy transformation above yields a key insight. Both the censored 
and the uncensored individuals contribute the amount  ( ) β , , 1 x l S i −  to the likelihood, the 
information that the duration of the experience had not ended by  1 − i l . Conditional on 
this information, the contributions differ only for period  i l t = . For the non-censored 
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= for i l j = . (A.7)   52 
The above expression is the probability that completion takes place between  1 − i l  and 
i l , given the fact that it has already lasted until  1 − i l .
29 For the censored cases, we have 
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x j S
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= −      for i l j = . (A.8) 
Lastly, we may rewrite the survivor function in  1 − = i l t  as the product of conditional 
survival probabilities for all periods up to  1 − i l :  
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1 1 θ θ θ  .  (A.10) 
We can rewrite this expression in a way that permits the maximum likelihood estima-
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z  .  (A.11) 
Using this variable in (A10) yields an expression that has the form of the likelihood for 
a generalised binary regression model: 
()















1 θ θ ⋅ − ∏ ∏ =
−
= =
 .  (A.12) 
For each duration experience i, (A.12) is the likelihood for  i l  independent binary 
observations with probabilities  j i, θ  and outcomes  j i z , . In order to use this for an esti-
                                                 
29 This conditional probability of completion is conceptually similar, although not identical, to the hazard 
rate defined above in (3) and (A.1). However, whereas θi,j is a true probability that is defined over an 
interval, the latter is an instantaneous rate that refers to a single point in the distribution and is allowed 
to have values greater than one. This is analogous to the relationship between a density of a continuous 
random variable and the probability that a value in a certain interval is assumed.      53
mate of β , we need the link function that relates  j i, θ  to the covariates  i x . A link func-
tion is a transformation such that the transformed probability  j i, θ  is a linear function of 
i x . With some algebra, we can show that under the Cox assumption (A.2), the follow-
ing relationship holds for the survivor function: 
() ( )
() β β
' exp , ,
x
o t S x t S =  ,  (A.13) 
and some more algebra yields the following link function: 























j τ  .  (A.15) 
The link function (A.14) is the complementary log-log function. After creating artificial 
values j and  j i z ,  for each interval  i l t ≤ , we define time dummies for each interval j. We 
can estimate β  and the  j τ  as the coefficients of the covariates and the time dummies, 
respectively, using a binary regression package with the link function (A.14).
30  
Several firms contribute more than one duration experience. We take account of 
the panel nature of our data-set calculating robust standard deviations clustered with 
respect to the firm, rather than those standard deviations that assume independence. This 
allows for an arbitrary correlation pattern for the observations of any given firm. The 
assumption of independence between firms, however, is retained.  
By means of (A.15), we can recover the maximum likelihood estimates of the 
baseline conditional survival probabilities,  ( ) ( ) 1 0 0 − t S t S , taking into account the fact 
that that  () 1 0 0 ≡ S . Calculating their products yields the estimate of the baseline survi-
vor function. In a model without covariates, the survivorship function estimated in this 
way is identical to the Kaplan-Meier estimator discussed earlier. The standard devia-
tions in Table A1 were calculated by simulating survival curves with 20,000 replica-
tions of  8 ,..., 1 , = τ j j , on the basis of the maximum likelihood estimation of the parame-
ter and the variance-covariance matrix. In the presence of covariates  j x , the baseline 
                                                 
30 For our estimations, we used the cloglog routine in Stata, version 8.   54 
survivorship function refers to a hypothetical unit with covariates  0 = j x . This is easy 
to interpret if the covariate is an indicator variable for a sample split. In more complex 
cases, however, the baseline survivor function does not necessarily make sense by itself.   55
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